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A Response to Marvin Becker, "An Essay
on the Vicissitudes of Civil Society with
Special Reference to Scotland in the
Eighteenth Century"
MICHAEL GROSSBERG*

I agreed to participate in this symposium partly because, like many others, I
have become intrigued by the growing presence of the concept of civil society in
contemporary political discourse. And before offering a few brief comments on
Marvin Becker's paper, I think I should make two confessions that reveal the
perspective from which I approach the subject and the paper. First, unlike
Becker, but I think like many historians, I consider myself rather
"philosophically challenged." That is, I am troubled by overly abstract analyses
that divorce ideas from their time and place and treat them rather like Genesis
treats birth-one begetting after another. It seems to me that much of the
discussion of civil society approaches the topic in that manner. Second, in terms
of the debate as framed in the materials compiled for this symposium, I would
lump myself with skeptics who share doubts about the normative and prescriptive
ramifications of the revival of civil society.
Becker's paper has helped me navigate through some of the philosophical
shoals of the debate over civil society while it has also reinforced my skepticism.
I want to explain both of these reactions by underscoring what I think are the
main lines of his argument and then by suggesting the kinds of questions and
challenges that I think it poses for a discussion of civil society.
As I read it, Becker has-drawn on his extensive study of the emergence of civil
society to offer a series of reflections on the development of the concept and on
the problems it has faced as a reality and as an idea since its inception in
eighteenth-century Scotland, England, and France. Like many readings of the
past that are directly addressed to present concerns, it is basically a cautionary
tale; in this case, a warning that fundamental elements of civil society led to its
quiescence in the nineteenth century and that those same elements make its
current revival a problematic enterprise. It seems to me that Becker develops this
argument by treating civil society as both a reality experienced in the past and an
idea borrowed from the past. Though he presents the reality and the idea of civil
society in a rather interwoven way, and clearly they are interconnected, I want
to separate the two to highlight what I think are the two basic components of his
argument.
The central focus of Becker's essay is a presentation of civil society as a
timebound concept produced during a privileged moment in late eighteenthcentury Western Europe, particularly in Scotland. He suggests in this piece, and
explains more fully in his recent book, that civil society not only emerged at a
certain time and in a certain place, but that it had a particular life course that
revealed its basic features if not its fundamental flaws or contradictions. These
essential features of civil society sprang from the primal connection of the
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concept to private property and a reified notion of a free market, the hierarchies
of power and authority that it sanctioned, and its tendency to tolerate only
incremental change.
At the same time, Becker also wants to chronicle civil society as a timeless
concept that can be and has been appropriated from the past for use in
contemporary political debate. He does so-particularly in his oral
presentation-in a series of asides, assertions, and analogies that range over a
variety of present-day, and primarily American, issues. These issues range from
abortion to the Congressional Republican "Contract with America." He points
to the revival of civil society to suggest that in many ways contemporary
European and North American polities are fundamentally inhospitable to civil
society as it has been conventionally conceived. And he expresses skepticism in
particular about the likelihood of using civil society to try to redress basic forms
of inequality, to achieve social and economic justice, or to resolve fundamental
ideological disagreements.' Despite its appeal to many as an idealized set of
institutions separate from the state, Becker's argument implies that civil society
may be a rather weak vessel for social transformation.
Becker's presentation of civil society as a dual concept purposefully raises
questions about the meaning and significance of the connections between the
civil society as a timebound reality and as a timeless idea. I think that the way to
introduce those questions is to rely on one of the keywords of historical
analysis-context. It is a word that historians use to label the particular
timebound environment that produces an event or idea. To understand the
dualities of the concept of civil society, Becker has tried to reconstruct the
context in which it was first created as well as to suggest the need to do the same
for the present. He has done the former by using a form of historical analysis that
turns the word "context" into a method: contextualization. This form of
intellectual history was developed most fruitfully by J.G.A. Pocock and Quentin
Skinner in studies of early modern European political thought.2 Its governing
assumption is that ideas cannot be understood apart from their context; and thus,
the past is not readily understandable to people in the present. Its ideas, in short,
are not easily exportable across time and space. And I would add that attempts
to appropriate uncontextualized ideas from the past, evident I think in so much
American constitutional discourse, ought to be considered primarily as forms of
legitimation. That is, they are examples of the use of the past to give a present
policy belief an intellectual pedigree by treating it as a child of ancient and thus
seemingly unassailable parentage. In any event, through the method of
contextualization the job of the historian is to make the past comprehensible by
reconstructing the context that produced its dominant ideas. Those ideas, in turn,
become the means for explaining the past in the present.

1. Marvin Becker, An Essay on the Vicissitudes of Civil Society with SpecialReference
to Scotland in the Eighteenth Century, 72 IND. L.J. 463, 469 (1997).
2. For the seminal studies using this method see J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN
MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION
(1975); QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1979).
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As I have tried to suggest, I think Becker's intent is to argue that civil society
can only be understood through a double process of contextualization. First, the
moment of its origin must be reconstructed and analyzed; second, its present
revival must be subjected to similar analysis. His essay concentrates on the
former task, while hinting at the need for the latter. Thus he implies that
historical analysis can be brought to bear on the present as well as the past. In
doing so, it seems to me that his message is that civil society was a product of a
particular time and place whose meaning cannot be known without understanding
that context. And thus the present incarnation of civil society is in many
significant ways a different concept that is linked to the past but equally tethered
to a particular present. Once again, I would suggest that one implication of this
argument is to suggest that many contemporary attempts to appropriate the past
by treating civil society as a constant and unchanging feature of European and
North American politics ought to be understood as forms of legitimation.
Both of Becker's usages of contextualization raise a number of questions for
me, and I want to highlight two of them. First, as a historian I wonder how his
approach to the meaning of civil society helps us recover and better understand
the era in which it was conceived. In particular, Becker's paper forces me to
think about how his reading of the period can be integrated into our
understanding of that time. Thus I wonder about the relationship between the
creation of civil society and the seemingly simultaneous reliance on republican
political thought. The literature on republicanism has become voluminous and
has engaged the passions of lawyers as well as historians. Just as Pocock and
Skinner argued that we had misunderstood Early Modem European political
actors because they had used republican ideas and rhetoric that we had not
understood, so Becker's argument implies that many of those same political
actors were busily constructing a civil society and we have simply failed to
recognize the existence let alone the importance of this construction project. Yet
the relationship between the civil society and republicanism, and the apparently
coterminous creation of liberalism, clearly warrants further elaboration and
explication. And if I try to apply Becker's argument to the United States, it seems
like the construction of key institutions of an American civil society, particularly
voluntary associations and nonstatist institutions like newspapers, occurred
during incredibly divisive and polarizing times such as the 1790s with its bitter
political warfare over the French revolution and civil liberties. Thus, American
experience may suggest civil societies might well be constructed in times of
fundamental disagreement. In a similar fashion, historian Richard R. John has
recently argued that the most critical source of American civil society was a
singular state action: the establishment of an expansive postal system early in the
nineteenth century that subsidized the free flow of communication through
newspapers, journals, and private correspondence. 3 In a different vein, Becker's
argument about the period provokes comparisons with Jilrgen Habermas's
influential notion of the creation of a public sphere at roughly the same time that

3. RiCHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM
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Becker charts the construction of civil society.4 Indeed, though less confident
than Habermas in the ability of civil society to create reasoned discourse and
spawn significant social change,' Becker treats the public sphere and civil society
rather like interchangeable labels for the same phenomenon. And like Habermas,
he also treats civil society as a rather monolithic and uniform phenomenon.
Consequently, his argument is open to the same kind of critique as that which has
been directed at Habermas. In particular, recent attempts to understand the
eighteenth-century public sphere have treated it less as a monolithic sector of
society, and have instead recovered its gendered, racial, class, spatial, and other
dimensions.6 Finally, I wonder about the relationship in the era between civil
society and the creation and application of legal rules. It was a period, as P.S.
Atiyah has demonstrated for England and Morton J. Horwitz for the United
States, in which contractualism not only played an important role in political
theory, but contract law played a crucial role in economic thought and practice.7
The role of contractualism in the market regimes of the era and its tendencies to
deify individual wills and promote certain allocations of power and authority
must be related to civil society as well. In sum, Becker's call to contextualize
civil society in the eighteenth century makes me think about the range of
challenges unleashed by that request.
Second, as I have said, the implication of Becker's approach and the message
of his asides is that the present use of civil society must be subject to the same
kind of contextualization that he has applied to the eighteenth century. Though
this point is far less developed in his essay than the previous one, Becker's
detailed explication of the emergence of civil society in a particular time and
place raises questions about how we ought to go about understanding its revival.
Two questions seem particularly significant: What are the central elements of the
present use of the term that can be identified to understand its meaning? Why is
the present such a supportive environment for the concept? These questions, in
turn, raise another equally critical one that link the two central points of Becker's
essay: why has the idea of civil society persisted from the late eighteenth century
to the late twentieth? In other words, his questions about the present provoke
questions about now and then and the connections between the two.
Much of this symposium is devoted to an analysis of contemporary usages of
civil society. As a historian, my own response to these questions is to think about
ways that civil society was institutionalized, and thus, not only how the concept
was constructed, but how it was modified over time. Becker suggests that the
longevity of civil society has been due in part to the "political brokering of

4. See JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIErY (Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence

trans., 1989).
5. Becker, supra note 1, at 471.
6. For discussions of this concept see HABERmAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Craig Calhoun
et al. eds., 1992); Anthony J. La Vopa, Conceiving a Public: Ideas and Society in EighteenthCentury, 64 J. MOD. HIST. 79-116 (1992); Benjamin Nathans, Habermas's "PublicSphere"
in the Era of the FrenchRevolution, 16 FR. HIST. STUD. 620-44 (1990).
7. See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
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bargains between 'citizen-haves' and 'citizen-have-nots"' and to the successes
of the welfare state.' I would add to that analysis a development that seems
particularly relevant to this forum: the continuing importance of lawyers in
Western European and North American civil societies. Members of the bar
seemed to have occupied privileged places and indeed assumed authority to
police the boundaries between public and private in all civil societies. And yet
their role also underscores the diverse forms of civil society. As Becker points
out, David A. Bell has argued that French lawyers found a voice and power
through the creation of a civil society.9 Yet, conversely, David Sugarman
suggests that the English bar maintained its authority not by creating but by
colonizing civil society." At the same time, there are numerous testaments to the
uniquely powerful role of American lawyers in the public sphere, and especially
in the creation of its nonstatist institutions. " In short, understanding the
persistence of civil society seems critical to unpacking its present context and to
probing its past diversity.
I will close, then, by saying that Becker's paper has been very useful to me
because it helps me locate the concept of.civil society in the past as well as the
present and, in the process, suggests the importance of the connections between
the two. And thus, rather than providing pat answers, I think that Becker's
primary contribution to this symposium, like most compelling works of historical
analysis, is to raise critical questions. My intent has been to identify some of
them and suggest their significance.

8. Becker, supranote 1, at 466.
9. See DAvID A. BELL, LAWYERS AND CITIzENS: THE MAKING OF A POLITICAL ELrIE IN OLD
REGIME FRANCE (1994); David A. Bell, Barrister,Politics,and the Failure of Civil Society in
Old Regime France,in LAWYERS AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Terrance Halliday & Lucien

Karpik eds., forthcoming spring 1997).
10. David Sugarman, Who Colonized Whom?: HistoricalReflections on the Intersection
Between Law, Lawyers, and Accountants in England, in PROFESSIONAL COMPETITION AND
PROFESSIONAL POWER: LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCrION OF
MARKETS (Yves Dezalay '&David Sugarman eds., 1993).

11. For a particularly evocative discussion of the power of lawyers as private actors in
American society see PETER D. HALL, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1700-1900
(1982).

